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ABSTRACT
Network users can choose among different security solutions
to protect their data. Those solutions are offered by com-
peting providers, with possibly different performance and
price levels. In this paper, we model the interactions among
users as a noncooperative game, with a negative external-
ity coming from the fact that attackers target popular sys-
tems to maximize their expected gain. Using a nonatomic
weighted congestion game model for user interactions, we
prove the existence and uniqueness of a user equilibrium,
compute the corresponding Price of Anarchy, that is the
loss of efficiency due to user selfishness, and investigate some
consequences for the (higher-level) pricing game played by
security providers.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6 [Management of Computing and Information Sys-
tems]: Economics; K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Elec-
tronic Commerce—security
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Game theory, Weighted games, Security
1. INTRODUCTION
Within the current evolution towards the Future Internet,
the provision of appropriate network security is considered
to be one of the most difficult as well as most challeng-
ing tasks. Among the broad range of related research ap-
proaches, the attempt to better understand the mindset of
attackers serves for sure as one of the key sources for de-
veloping advanced protection mechanisms. In this context,
it is especially interesting to consider attacker preferences
from a global operating system perspective. For instance, a
recent survey showed that “more than half (52%) of Amer-
icans believe that PCs are very or extremely vulnerable to
cybercrime attacks ... By contrast, only 20% say Macs are
very or extremely vulnerable to attacks” [9]. This suggests
that among all machines that get compromised year by year,
a clear majority are running Windows, and that this asym-
metry even remains when considering the relative market
shares of all OSs. That situation may be ascribed to several
reasons: Firstly, different OSs of course exhibit different rel-
ative security performance. Furthermore, the heterogeneity
in protection results may come from heterogeneity in aver-
age user skills with respect to the various OSs (e.g., Linux or
Mac OS vs Windows). Finally, another explanation - that
we will focus on in this paper - is directly linked to the mar-
ket shares of OSs. Indeed, since Linux or Mac users with a
market share of 5% or less are still marginal with respect to
the 90% market share of Windows1, they are simply making
a less interesting target for profit-minded attackers.
The latter interpretation of the phenomenon is justified by
the fact that cybercrime concerns huge amounts of money,
and is highly organized so that attacker efforts are rational-
ized to maximize the associated gains. That interpretation
also raises an interesting negative externality effect of secu-
rity architectures and systems, through the attractiveness
for potential attackers. Indeed, the choice of a particular
system and security protection -that we will call a security
provider from now on- by the whole online population can
now be considered as a congestion game, where congestion is
not considered in the common sense of an excessive demand
for a finite resource amount, but more generally as a degra-
dation of the performance on a given choice when it gets
too popular. Here the performance degradation is indirect,
since it stems from the behavior of attackers.
In the specific context of security, the link between the au-
dience of a system and its attractiveness to attackers can be
further described when attacks are intended to steal or dam-
age data: an attacker would be attracted by the potential
gain (or damage) of the attack, which depends on the value
of the users’ data, but that value affects (and is therefore, to
some extent, revealed by) the security option users choose.
1Source: http://marketshare.hitslink.com/
operating-system-market-share.aspx?qprid=8
For example, the “safest” solutions may attract users with
high-value data to protect, making those solutions an inter-
esting target for an attacker even if their market share is
small.
In this paper, we propose a model that encompasses that
effect, by considering users with heterogeneous data values
making a choice among several security possibilities. The
criteria considered in that choice are the security protection
level -measured by the likeliness of having one’s data stolen
or damaged, that is subject to negative externalities- and
the price set by the security provider. The negative exter-
nalities come from attacker behavior, and are formulated
not in terms of the market share of each security solution
but rather in terms of potential gain, hence, of total value
of the data protected through a given solution. Assuming
each individual user has a negligible impact on the protec-
tion level, we establish the existence and uniqueness of a user
equilibrium by proving that the game admits a strictly con-
vex potential function. The results are then applied to give
some insights about the prices that profit-oriented security
providers should set.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
related work and the specificities taken into account in our
model. The model is formally introduced in Section 3. We
focus on the user equilibrium existence and uniqueness in
Section 4, and give an upper bound on the loss of efficiency
due to user selfishness. The consequences on provider pric-
ing decisions are studied in Section 5. We conclude and
suggest directions for future work in Section 6.
2. RELATEDWORK
The literature on network security involving game-theoretic
models and tools is recent and still not very abundant. Some
very interesting works have been published regarding the in-
teractions between attacking and defending entities, where
the available strategies can consist in spreading effort over
the links of a network [6, 16] or over specific targets [8], or in
selecting some particular attack or defense measures [5, 12].
In those references, the security game is a zero-sum game be-
tween two players only, and therefore no externalities among
several potential defenders are considered.
Another stream of work considers security protection invest-
ments, through models that encompass positive externali-
ties among users: indeed, when considering epidemic attacks
(like, e.g., worms), the likeliness of being infected decreases
with the proportion of neighbors that are protected. Since
protection has a cost and users selfishly decide to protect
or not without considering the externality they generate,
the equilibrium outcome is such that investment is subopti-
mal [13] and needs to be incentivized through specific mea-
sures [18, 19]. For more references on game theory applied
to network security contexts, see [1, 20].
In contrast, the work presented here considers negative ex-
ternalities in the choices of security software/procedures.
As highlighted in the introduction, the negative external-
ity comes from the attractiveness of security solutions for
attackers. Such situations can arise when attacks are not
epidemic but rather direct, as are attacks targeting ran-
domly chosen IP addresses. The interaction among users
can then be modeled as a population game, that is a game
where the user payoffs for a given strategy (here, a secu-
rity solution) change as more users choose that same strat-
egy [11]. Such games are particular cases of so-called con-
gestion games where user strategies are subsets of a given
set of resources, and the total cost experienced by users is
the sum of the costs on each resource [2, 24]. Here, users
select only one resource, and congestion corresponds to the
fact that the more customers, the more likely an attack.
In this paper, we consider a very large population, where the
extra congestion created by any individual user is negligible.
The set of players can therefore be considered as a contin-
uum; note that such games are called nonatomic [31]. While
the study of nonatomic congestion games has seen recent ad-
vances for the case when all users are identical or belong to
a finite set of populations [7, 15, 26, 27, 28], we want here
to encompass the larger attractiveness to attackers of “rich”
users, compared to the ones with no valuable data online.
More precisely, we intend to model the heterogeneity in users
congestion effects, by introducing a distribution among users
valuation for the data to protect. The congestion game is
therefore weighted in the sense that not all users contribute
to congestion in an identical manner. Fewer results exist for
those games [4, 23], even when user strategies only consist in
choosing one resource among a strategy set that is identical
for all players.
Moreover, in our model users undergo the congestion cost of
the security solution they select - which depends on the con-
gestion as well as on their particular data valuation -, but
also the monetary cost associated to that solution - which
is the same for all users -. As a result, following [22, 23] the
game would be called a weighted congestion game with sepa-
rable preferences, and can be transformed into an equivalent
weighted congestion game with player-specific constants [21]
(i.e., the payoffs of users selecting the same strategy only
differ through a user-specific additive constant). In gen-
eral, the existence of an equilibrium is not ensured for such
games when the number of users is finite [21, 22, 23]. In the
nonatomic case, the existence of a mixed equilibrium is en-
sured by [31] and the loss of efficiency due to user selfishness
is bounded [4], but the existence of a pure equilibrium in the
general case is not guaranteed. In this paper, we establish
the existence and essential uniqueness of a pure equilibrium
for our model, through a potential function. Such proofs
for nonatomic games had only been given for unweighted
games [29, 30], with possibly a finite number of different user
populations; here we consider a weighted game with possi-
bly an infinity of different weight values, with the specificity
that the differences in user congestion weights are directly
linked to their user-specific valuations.
3. MODEL
We consider a set I of security providers (each one on a
given architecture), and define I := |I|.
3.1 User data valuation
Users differ with the valuation for their data. When an at-
tack is successful over a target user u, that user is assumed
to experience a financial loss vu ≥ 0, that we call her data
valuation. The distribution of valuations over the popula-
tion is given by a cumulative distribution function F on R+,
where F (v) represents the proportion of users with valua-
tion lower or equal to v. Since users who do not value their
data (i.e., for whom vu = 0) will not play any role in our
model, we can ignore them; the distribution function F is
therefore such that F (0) = 0. The overall total “mass” of
users is finite, and through a unit change we can assume it
to be 1 without loss of generality.
Equivalently, the repartition F of user preferences among
the population can be represented by its corresponding quan-
tile function q : [0, 1) → R+. For x ∈ [0, 1), the quan-
tity q(x) represents the valuation2 of the (infinitesimal) user
at (continuous) position x on a valuation-related increasing
ranking. Formally, we have
∀x ∈ [0, 1), q(x) = inf{v ∈ R+ : F (v) ≥ x}, (1)
∀v ∈ R+, F (v) = inf{x ∈ [0, 1) : q(x) > v}, (2)
with the convention inf ∅ := 1 in the latter equation. Note
that F is right-continuous, while the quantile function q is
left-continuous. Both functions are nonnegative and nonde-
creasing.
We may not suppose that the support of F , that we denote
by Sv, is bounded, but we will assume that the overall value
of the data in the population is finite, i.e., we consider that
Vtot :=
∫
Sv
v dF (v) < +∞.
Finally, we defineN (V ) as the user mass3 such that the total
data valuation for the N (V ) users with smallest valuation
exactly equals V :
∀V ∈ [0, Vtot), N (V ) := min
{
x :
∫ x
y=0
q(y)dy = V
}
.
N (V ) is obtained by inverting the bijective function
V : [0, 1] 7→ [0, Vtot]
x → V(x) =
∫ x
y=0
q(y)dy. (3)
Notice that V is continuous and differentiable on [0, 1], with
left-derivative q(x) and right-derivative q(x+), where q(x+) =
limy→x,y>x q(y). Since q is nondecreasing and strictly pos-
itive for x > 0, then V is convex and strictly increasing
on [0, 1]. As a result, its inverse function N is concave on
(0, Vtot), and has left-derivative
N ′l (V ) = 1
q(N (V )) (4)
and right-derivative
N ′r(V ) = 1
q(N (V )+) . (5)
The distribution F , the quantity Vtot as well as the functions
q and N are illustrated in Figure 1.
2Except, possibly, on a zero-measure set of users.
3i.e., proportion since we normalized the total user mass to
1.
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Figure 1: Values and functions of interest regarding
the user valuation distribution F .
Throughout the paper, while our results are valid for any
valuation distribution, we illustrate the results with numer-
ical examples considering an exponential distribution, i.e.,
such that
F (v) = 1− e−λv (6)
for a given λ > 0, where a straightforward calculation gives
λ = 1/Vtot. Such a distribution models an unbounded con-
tinuum of valuations among the population, where a large
majority of users have limited valuations, but there exist few
people with extremely high value data to protect.
3.2 Security systems performance
In this paper, we focus on direct attacks targeting some spe-
cific machines, which may for instance come from an attack-
generating robot that randomly chooses IP addresses and
launches attacks to those hosts.
The attacks generated by such a scheme have to target a
specific vulnerability of a given security system. As a result,
the attacker has to select which security system i ∈ I to
focus on. If an attack is launched to a security system i,
we consider that all machines protected by a system j 6= i
do not run any risk, while the success probability of the
attack is supposed to be fixed, denoted by pii, on machines
with protection system i. In other terms, the parameter pii
measures the effectiveness of the security defense.
3.3 The attacker point of view
Successful attacks bring some revenue to the attacker. Be
it in terms of damage done to user data, or in terms of
stolen data from users, it is reasonable to consider that for
a given attack, the gain for the attacker is proportional to
the value that the data had to the victim. Indeed, in the
case of data steal, more sensitive data (e.g., bank details)
are more likely to bring high revenues when used. Likewise,
when the objective of the attacker is simply to maximize user
damage, then the link between attacker utility and user data
valuation is direct.
For a given distribution of the population among providers,
we define for each provider i ∈ I the total value of the
protected data, as
Vi :=
∫
users with prov. i
v dF (v). (7)
For an attacker, the expected benefit from launching an at-
tack targeted at system i (but without knowing which users
are with provider i) is thus proportional to piiVi.
As a result, we can reasonably assume that the likeliness of
attacks occurring on system i is a nondecreasing function
of piiVi: the higher the potential attacker utility, the more
interesting the attack for the attacker. We discretize time,
and denote by Ri(piiVi) the probability that a particular
user is the target of a system-i attack over a time period.
Remark that we consider system-specific functions (Ri)i∈I ,
so that the model can encompass some heterogeneity in the
difficulty of creating system-targeted attacks.
To simplify a bit the writing, let us define Ti(Vi) as the risk,
for a user, of having one’s data compromised when choosing
security provider i. Since that risk is the product of the
attack success probability pii (assumed fixed for now) and
the attack occurrence probability Ri(piiVi), it can be written
as a function of the total protected data value Vi:
Ti(Vi) := piiRi(piiVi) = piiRi
(
pii
∫
users with prov. i
vdF (v)
)
. (8)
We will often make use of the assumption below.
Assumption A. For all i ∈ I, Ti is a continuous and
strictly increasing function of Vi, and Ti(0) = 0.
For Ti functions of the form given in (8), Assumption A is
equivalent to
• pii > 0 for all i ∈ I,
• Ri is a continuous and strictly increasing function with
Ri(0) = 0, for all i ∈ I.
The latter point suggests that attackers will not target providers
that do not protect valuable data, whereas the former means
that no provider offers a perfect protection against attacks.
3.4 User preferences
For a user u with data valuation vu, the total expected cost
at provider i depends on the risk of being (successfully) at-
tacked, and on the price pi charged by the security provider.
That total cost is therefore given by
vuTi(Vi) + pi.
To ensure that all users select one option, we can assume
that there exists a provider i with pi = 0, which would cor-
respond to security solutions offered by free software com-
munities (e.g., avast! R©4). Indeed, if pi = 0, the total cost is
4http://www.avast.com
the valuation times a product of probabilities, and therefore
less than the valuation itself, so that this choice of a free
service is always a valuable option5.
Remark that we consider risk-neutral users here, as may
be expected from large entities, while private individuals
should rather be considered risk-averse. Nevertheless, one
can imagine some extra mechanisms (e.g., insurance [19]) to
reach a risk-neutral equivalent formulation.
4. USER EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we investigate how demand is split among
providers, when their prices pi and security levels pii are
fixed. Recall we assumed that users are infinitely small:
their individual choices do not affect the overall user dis-
tribution among providers (and therefore the total values
(Vi)i∈I).
The outcome from such user interactions should be deter-
mined by user selfishness: demand should be distributed in
such a way that each user u chooses one of the cheapest
providers (in terms of perceived price) with respect to her
valuation vu and the current risk values (Ti(Vi))i∈I . Such
a distribution of users among providers, if it exists, will be
called a user equilibrium. In other words, if provider i ∈ I is
chosen by some users u, then it is cheaper for those users (in
terms of total expected cost) than any other provider j ∈ I,
otherwise they would be better off switching to j. Formally,
i ∈ arg min
j∈I
vuTj(Vj) + pj .
We use here the nonatomicity assumption: an individual
user switching providers has no influence on expected costs,
so each user u considers the values (Vj)i∈I as fixed.
4.1 Structure of a user equilibrium
We now investigate the existence and uniqueness of a user
equilibrium, for fixed values of prices and attack success
probabilities, when Ri is a strictly increasing function for
all i ∈ I. To do so, we first define the notion of user repar-
tition.
Definition 1. Denote by PI the set of probability dis-
tributions over providers in I, i.e., PI := {(y1, ..., yI) ≥
0,
∑
i∈I yi = 1}. For a given price profile p = (p1, ..., pI),
a user repartition is a mapping A : Sv 7→ PI , that is inter-
preted as follows:
For all v ∈ Sv, among users with valuation v, a proportion
Ai(v) chooses provider i,
where A(v) = (A1(v), ..., AI(v)).
Therefore, to a given user repartitionA corresponds a unique
distribution of the total data valuation Vtot among providers,
given by
Vi(A) =
∫
v∈Sv
v Ai(v) dF (v) ∀i ∈ I. (9)
5We implicitly assume here that each user u is willing to pay
at least vu to benefit from the online service.
Reciprocally, we say that a distribution V = (Vi)i∈I of the
data valuation is feasible if Vi ≥ 0 for all i, and ∑i∈I Vi =
Vtot. For a feasible distribution V, when providers are sorted
such that p1 ≤ ... ≤ pI , we define for each i ∈ I ∪ {0} the
quantity
V[i] :=
i∑
j=1
Vj ,
with V[0] = 0. V[i] therefore represents the total value of the
data protected by the i cheapest providers.
We now formally define the outcome that we should expect
from the interaction of users, i.e., an equilibrium situation.
Definition 2. A user equilibrium is a user repartition
Aeq such that no user has an interest to switch providers. In
other words, for any value v ∈ Sv, a user with valuation v
cannot do better than following the provider choice given by
Aeq(v). Formally, Aeq is a user equilibrium if and only if
∀v ∈ Sv,
Aeqi (v) > 0 ⇒ i ∈ arg min
j∈I
vTj(Vj(A
eq)) + pj , (10)
where Vj(A
eq) is given by (9).
We first establish some monotonicity properties that should
be verified by a user equilibrium: if a user y values her data
strictly less than another user x, then she selects cheaper (in
terms of price) providers than x.
Lemma 1. Consider a user equilibrium Aeq. Then user
choices -in terms of price of the chosen provider(s)- are
monotone in their valuation: for any two users x and y with
respective valuations vx and vy, and any providers i and j,
(vx − vy) ·Aeqi (vx) ·Aeqj (vy) > 0 ⇒ pi ≥ pj . (11)
Proof. Let us write Vi := Vi(A
eq) and Vj := Vj(A
eq).
From (10) applied to users x and y, the left-hand inequality
of (11) implies
vxTi(Vi) + pi ≤ vxTj(Vj) + pj
and vyTi(Vi) + pi ≥ vyTj(Vj) + pj . (12)
Subtracting those inequalities gives Ti(Vi) ≤ Tj(Vj) since
(vx−vy) > 0. Then (12) yields the right-hand side of (11).
We then use that result to prove that for a given value repar-
tition (Vi)i∈I over the providers, there can be only one equi-
librium repartition if all providers set different prices.
Lemma 2. Assume that all providers set different prices.
If a user equilibrium exists, it is completely characterized
(unless for a zero-measure set of users) by the total values
(Vi)i∈I of protected data for each provider i ∈ I, provided
that
∑
i∈I Vi = Vtot.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that provider
prices are sorted, such that p1 < p2 < ... < pI .
From Definition 1 and (9), to a given equilibrium corre-
sponds a unique set of values (Vi)i∈I .
Reciprocally, consider a feasible data value repartition V =
(Vi)i∈I , and assume it corresponds to a user equilibriumAeq.
Since we do not differentiate users with similar valuations,
we can sort them -still without loss of generality- in an in-
creasing order of the price of their chosen provider: if x < y
and q(x) = q(y) then we can impose that pix ≤ piy , where ix
(resp. iy) would be the (unique) provider chosen by user at
position x (resp. y) in the user valuation ranking. Therefore
from Lemma 1, at the user equilibrium Aeq, provider prices
can be considered as sorted in a increasing order of user val-
uations among all users. As a result, provider choices are
uniquely (unless on a zero-measure user set) determined by
their position x ∈ [0, 1] in the user valuation ranking, and
given by
V(x) ∈ (V[i−1], V[i]) ⇒ user x selects provider i, (13)
where V is defined in (3).
4.2 The case of several providers with the same
price
In this subsection, we establish a way to consider several
providers with the same price as one single option from the
user point of view. Let us consider a common price p, and
define Ip := {i ∈ I : pi = p}.
First, it is easy to see that if one such provider i gets nonneg-
ligible demand (i.e., Vi > 0), then at a user equilibrium all
providers with the same price also get nonnegligible demand:
indeed, Assumption A implies that Ti > 0, and therefore
the total cost of a user u with positive valuation choosing
provider i ∈ Ip is vuTi(Vi) + p > p. Therefore each provider
j ∈ Ip necessarily has a strictly positive Tj , otherwise it
would have cost vuTj(0) + p = p for user u, who would be
better off switching from i to j. Consequently, at a user
equilibrium we necessarily have Ti(Vi) = Tj(Vj).
When the set of users choosing one of the providers with
price p is fixed, so is the total valuation VIp of those users’
data. Consequently, the distribution of users among all
providers in Ip should be such that{
i, j ∈ Ip ⇒ Ti(Vi) = Tj(Vj)∑
i∈Ip Vi = VIp .
(14)
Following [2], we reformulate (14) as a minimization prob-
lem:
(Vi)i∈Ip ∈ arg min
(xi)i∈Ip≥0
∑
i∈Ip
∫ xi
y=0
Ti(y)dy (15)
s.t.
∑
i∈Ip
xi = VIp .
Under Assumption A, there exists a unique vector of val-
ues (Vi)i∈Ip satisfying the above system. In the following,
we will denote by TIp(V ) the corresponding common value
of Ti(Vi). Interestingly, remark that the function TIp that
we have defined also satisfies Assumption A. As a result,
in the rest of the analysis of user equilibria, we will asso-
ciate providers with the same price p and consider them as
a single choice Ip that we assimilate as a single provider k,
with corresponding risk function Tk(V ) := TIp(V ) satisfying
Assumption A.
4.3 A potential game
Based on the reasoning in Subsection 4.2, we assume that
all providers submit a different price, and we sort them such
that p1 < ... < pI . For a given feasible value repartition
V = (Vi)i∈I among providers, we consider that users react
selfishly and therefore make their provider choice according
to (13). Now let us consider the following measure:
L(V,p) :=
∑
i∈I
(∫ Vi
y=0
Ti(y)dy + pi
(
N(V[i])−N(V[i−1])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Market share of prov. i
))
(16)
=
I∑
i=1
∫ Vi
y=0
Ti(y)dy + pI −
I−1∑
i=1
(pi+1−pi)N(V[i]), (17)
with p0 := 0.
Remark that the first part of the quantity L(V,p) in (16)
is the potential function usually associated to unweighted
congestion games (see, e.g., [2]), while the second part stands
for the total price paid by all users.
The expression (17) highlights the fact that L is a strictly
convex function of V, since N is concave and under As-
sumption A, Ti is strictly increasing. As a result, it admits
a unique minimum V∗ on the (convex) domain of feasible
value shares; and V∗ is completely characterized by the first-
order conditions. We now prove that this valuation reparti-
tion V∗ actually corresponds to a user equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption A hold. For any price
profile p, there exists a user equilibrium, that is completely
characterized by the valuation repartition V∗, unique solu-
tion of the convex optimization problem
min
V feasible
L(V,p). (18)
Proof. We first consider the feasible directions consist-
ing in switching some infinitesimal amount of value from
i > 1 to j < i, when V ∗i > 0. The optimality condition
in (17) then yields
0 ≤ Tj(V ∗j )− Ti(V ∗i )−
i−1∑
k=j
(pk+1 − pk)N ′r(V ∗[k])
≤ Tj(V ∗j )− Ti(V ∗i )− (pi − pj)N ′r(V ∗[i−1]), (19)
where the second line comes from the concavity of N .
Notice that since pj < pi and N is nondecreasing, Rela-
tion (19) and Assumption A imply that V ∗j > 0.
Consequently, if we define i∗ := max{i ∈ I : V ∗i > 0}, then
we have
V ∗i > 0⇔ i ≤ i∗. (20)
As a result, since Vi > 0 and i > 1 in (19), then 0 < V
∗
[i−1] <
Vtot. Thus, from (5), N ′r(V ∗[i−1]) = 1q(N (V ∗
[i−1]))
is strictly
positive. Relation (19) is then equivalent to
v∗i Ti(V
∗
i ) + pi ≤ v∗i Tj(V ∗j ) + pj , (21)
with v∗i := q(N (V ∗[i−1])+) = inf{v :
∫ v
u=0
udF (u) > V ∗[i−1]}.
Remark that necessarily from (21), Ti(V
∗
i ) < Tj(V
∗
j ) since
pi > pj .
For i < I such that V ∗i > 0 (i.e., i ≤ i∗), we now investigate
the possibility of switching some value from i to j > i. Still
applying the optimality condition for V∗, we get
0 ≤ Tj(V ∗j )− Ti(V ∗i ) +
j−1∑
k=i
(pk+1 − pk)N ′l (V ∗[k]) (22)
≤ Tj(V ∗j )− Ti(V ∗i ) + (pj − pi)N ′l (V ∗[i]), (23)
where we used again the concavity of N .
Applying (4), Relation (23) is equivalent to
v¯∗i Ti(V
∗
i ) + pi ≤ v¯∗i Tj(V ∗j ) + pj , (24)
with v¯∗i = q(N (V ∗[i])) = inf{v :
∫ v
u=0
udF (u) ≥ V ∗[i]}.
Relations (21) and (24) can be interpreted as users with
valuation v ∈ [v∗i , v¯∗i ] preferring provider i over any other
provider, for the repartition value V∗. Formally,
v ∈ [v∗i , v¯∗i ] ⇒ i ∈ arg min
j∈I
vTj(V
∗
j ) + pj . (25)
Now, consider the provider choices induced by the value
repartition V∗ as given in (13). We prove here that this
repartition is a user equilibrium, since no user has an inter-
est to change providers.
Take a provider i ∈ I. We then have for x ∈ [0, 1],
V(x) ∈ (V ∗[i−1], V ∗[i]) ⇔ V ∗[i−1] <
∫ x
y=0
q(y)dy < V ∗[i]
⇔ N (V ∗[i−1]) < x < N (V ∗[i])
⇒ v∗i ≤ q(x) ≤ v¯∗i .
The last line and (25) imply that the considered user, that is
at position x in the population when it is ranked according
to valuations, cannot do better than choosing the provider
suggested by (13). In other words, each user is satisfied
with her current provider choice, i.e., we have a user equi-
librium.
We now establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium value
repartition V∗ (and thus, of the user equilibrium due to
Lemma 2 when all prices are different).
Proposition 2. Under Assumption A, the value reparti-
tion at a user equilibrium necessarily equals
V∗ = arg min
V feasible
L(V,p).
Consequently, there exists a unique value equilibrium value
repartition, and there exists a user equilibrium that is unique
(unless for a zero-measure set of users) when all providers
set different prices.
Note that the uniqueness of the equilibrium value repartition
V∗ implies that even in cases where several user equilibria
exist, for all users the cost of each provider at equilibrium is
unique; in that sense the user equilibrium is said essentially
unique [2].
Proof. We consider a user equilibrium, and prove that
the corresponding value repartition V˜ satisfies the first-order
conditions of the convex optimization problem (18), that has
been shown to have a unique solution V∗.
We actually only need to show the counterpart of Rela-
tion (19) (resp., (23)) for j = i − 1 (resp., j = i + 1), since
the other cases immediately follow.
From (13), at a user equilibrium we should have for all x ∈
(0, 1) and all i, j ∈ I,
x ∈
(
N (V˜[i−1]),N (V˜[i])
)
⇒ q(x)(Ti(V˜i)− Tj(V˜j)) + pi − pj ≤ 0. (26)
Consider i ∈ I such that V˜i > 0.
• If j = i − 1, then Ti(V˜i) − Tj(V˜j) < 0. Applying (26)
when x tends to N (V˜[i−1]), we have
q(N (V˜[i−1])+)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=N ′r(V˜[i−1])
(Ti(V˜i)− Tj(V˜j)) + pi − pj ≤ 0,
which is exactly the counterpart of (19).
• Likewise for j = i+1, from (26) for x tending toN (V˜[i])
we get (using the fact that q is left-continuous)
q(N (V˜[i]))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=N ′
l
(V˜[i])
(Ti(V˜i)− Tj(V˜j)) + pi − pj ≤ 0,
the counterpart of (23).
Consequently, the value repartition V˜ satisfies the first-order
conditions of the convex optimization problem (18) and is
feasible, therefore V˜ coincides with the unique solution V∗
of the problem.
The second claim of the proposition is a direct application
of Lemma 2.
Note that it was not compulsory to aggregate providers
with the same price p: at the minimum of L(·,p) we notice
from (15) that the term
∫ VIp
0 TIp involving the aggregated
function coincides with the corresponding separate expres-
sion
∑
i∈Ip
∫ xi
y=0
Ti(y)dy. Therefore, the equilibrium value
distribution V∗ can directly be found by solving the po-
tential minimization problem (18). Nevertheless, the in-
terpretation of the potential is changed, since the terms
N (V[i]) − N (V[i−1]) of (16) do not necessarily correspond
anymore to provider i’s market share.
The next result shows some continuity properties verified by
the user equilibrium.
Proposition 3. The (unique) equilibrium value reparti-
tion V∗ is continuous in the price profile. Moreover, at any
price profile such that all prices are different, the provider
market shares are continuous in the price profile.
Proof. Remark that L(V,p) is jointly continuous in V
and p, and that the set of feasible value repartitions is com-
pact. Therefore, from the Theorem of the Maximum (see
[3]) applied to the minimization problem (18), the set of
equilibrium distributions is upper hemicontinuous in p. It
is actually continuous due to the uniqueness of the equilib-
rium distribution V∗.
For a given price profile p¯ where all prices differ, the strict
order of prices is maintained within a vicinity of p¯. There-
fore, in such a vicinity the market share of provider i is
N (V ∗[i])−N (V ∗[i−1]), which is jointly continuous in V and p
since N is continuous.
Note that while the equilibrium value repartition V∗ is con-
tinuous for all price profiles, that is not the case of provider
market shares. Indeed, market shares (θi)i∈I strongly de-
pend on the order of prices through the expression N (V ∗[i])−
N (V ∗[i−1]), that holds when prices are sorted in an increas-
ing order. Since N is a concave function, then the market
share of a provider may drastically decrease when a slight
price modification changes his position from k to k+1 in the
price ranking. This effect is more prominent whenN is more
concave, i.e., when user valuations are heterogeneous. In the
other extreme, if all users had the same valuation N would
be linear, and the market share of a provider i would simply
be θi = N (V ∗i ), which is continuous in the price profile.
4.4 Price of Anarchy of the user game
In non-cooperative games, the Price of Anarchy measures
the loss of efficiency due to user selfishness [17]. This metric
is usually defined as the worst-case ratio of the total cost
at an equilibrium to the minimal feasible total cost, and has
been extensively studied in the last years [7, 26, 27, 28]. The
results closest to the one presented in this subsection come
from [4]: the authors consider weighted congestion games,
where the cost experienced by each user would correspond
to the situation where all prices are set to 0 in our model.
Then the authors prove that the upper bound for the Price
of Anarchy is not greater for the weighted game than for
its unweighted counterpart. We actually establish the same
kind of result for any value of the provider price profile p,
except that in our case the total user cost (sum of the costs
perceived by all users) for any feasible user valuation repar-
tition V is
Cuser :=
∑
i∈I
(
ViTi(Vi) + pi(N (V[i])−N (V[i−1]))
)
. (27)
Proposition 4. Assume that the risk functions (Ti)i∈I
belong to a family C, and define as in [7] the quantity
β(C) := sup
T∈C,(x,y)∈[0,Vtot]2
x(T (y)− T (x))
yT (y)
.
Then for any nonnegative price profile p,
C∗user
Coptuser
≤ 1
1− β(C) , (28)
where C∗user (resp. C
opt
user) is the total user cost at the user
equilibrium (resp. the minimum total user cost) for the price
profile p.
Proof. We apply a variational inequality that is satis-
fied by the user equilibrium value repartition V∗, and that
directly stems from the fact that users only select their pre-
ferred provider, ignoring their externality effect: for any fea-
sible value repartition V, we have∑
i∈I
(
V ∗i Ti(V
∗
i ) + pi(N (V ∗[i])−N (V ∗[i−1]))
)
≤
∑
i∈I
(
ViTi(V
∗
i ) + pi(N (V[i])−N (V[i−1]))
)
.
This yields
C∗user ≤ Cuser +
∑
i∈I
Vi(Ti(V
∗
i )− Ti(Vi))
≤ Cuser + β(C)
∑
i∈I
V ∗i Ti(V
∗
i ) ≤ Cuser + β(C)C∗user,
which establishes the proposition.
As in [4], we find that the introduction of weights among
user congestion effects (and here, in addition, among user
perceived costs) does not worsen the Price of Anarchy. The
bound given in Proposition 4 can indeed be attained, when
C includes the constant functions, with a simple 2-provider
instance with prices set to zero, and all users having the
same weight (i.e., the valuation repartition is of the form
F (v) = 1l{v≥v0} for some v0 > 0, with 1l{A} = 1 if A is
verified, and 0 otherwise.).
5. PRICING DECISIONS OF SECURITY
PROVIDERS
We now focus at the decisions that are made by security
providers when choosing their charging price. We consider
that providers are able to anticipate the reactions of users,
and that they take those reactions into account when fixing
their prices. We then have a two-stage game, where at a
first step (larger time scale) providers compete on setting
their prices so as to maximize revenue, considering that at
a second step (smaller time scale) users selfishly select their
provider.
The utility of provider i is given by his revenue
ri := piθi,
where θi is the market share of provider i.
When all providers propose different prices and providers are
ranked such that p1 < p2 < ... < pI , from Proposition 2 the
user equilibrium exists and is unique, and we simply have
θi = N (V ∗[i])−N (V ∗[i−1]), where V∗ is the equilibrium value
repartition. On the other hand, if several providers in a set
Ip propose the same price p, then the equilibrium valuation
repartition V∗ is unique, but the user equilibrium choices
need not be unique: indeed, any price-monotone user repar-
tition consistent with V is a user equilibrium, and several
such repartitions may exist when several providers set the
same price. For those special cases, a reasonable assumption
could be that users make their provider choice independently
of their valuation when they have several equally preferred
providers. As a result, the total market share of providers
in Ip would be split among them proportionally to the data
value V ∗i that they attract, yielding
θi =
V ∗i∑
j:pj=pi
V ∗j
N ( ∑
j:pj≤pi
V ∗j )−N (
∑
j:pj<pi
V ∗j )
 .
We first establish that, when there exists a provider with
a bounded price, the revenue of another provider tends to
zero if he increases his price to infinity. In practice, such a
bounded-price option always exists, even if it has bad per-
formance: one just needs to consider any free security possi-
bility. The following proposition therefore proves that prices
will not be arbitrarily high when providers want to maximize
revenue.
Proposition 5. Assume that there exists a provider i0
whose price pi0 is bounded by p¯i0 . Then for any provider
j 6= i0, the revenue rj = pjθj tends to 0 when pj →∞.
Proof. Let us consider a user with valuation v, for whom
provider j is among the favorite providers. In particular,
that user prefers j over i0, thus at a user equilibrium we
have
v(Ti0(Vi0)− Tj(Vj)) ≥ pj − pi0 ≥ pj − p¯i0 . (29)
Therefore if pj > p¯i0 then Tj(Vj) < Ti0(Vi0) and
v ≥ pj − p¯i0
Ti0(Vi0)− Tj(Vj)
≥ pj − p¯i0
Ti0(Vtot)
:= vmin.
The revenue rj of provider j can then be upper bounded:
rj = pjθj ≤ pj
∫ +∞
v=vmin
dF (v)
= Ti0(Vtot)
pj − p¯i0
Ti0(Vtot)
∫ +∞
v=
pj−p¯i0
Ti0
(Vtot)
dF (v)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−−−−→
pj→∞
0
+
+p¯i0
∫ +∞
v=
pj−p¯i0
Ti0
(Vtot)
dF (v)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−−−−→
pj→∞
0
,
where the two terms tend to zero since
∫∞
0
vdF (v) = Vtot <
∞.
5.1 Licensed versus free security provider
We first consider a simple situation with two providers, but
only one trying to maximize his profit through subscription
benefits. The other provider (or, more likely, a community
of developers) offers the security service for free and does
not play on price.
Denote by 0 and 1 the freeware provider and the licensed
provider, respectively. While provider 0 does not care about
profits and simply sets his price to p0 = 0, provider 1 has
to choose a strictly positive price p1 = p > 0 to get some
benefit.
From Proposition 1, there exists a unique value repartition
(V0(p), Vtot − V0(p)) at the user equilibrium, for any price p
set by provider 1. Likewise, for any p > 0 the equilibrium
market share of provider 1 is unique and given by θ1 =
1 − N (V0(p)); the profit maximization problem of provider
1 can therefore be written as
max
p≥0
p · (1−N (V0(p))). (30)
Note that provider 1 gets demand as soon as his price is
strictly below sup(Sv)× T0(Vtot), therefore by choosing p ∈
(0, sup(Sv)T0(Vtot)) he can ensure a positive revenue. The
next result directly follows from Propositions 3 and 5, and
simply states that the provider revenue optimization prob-
lem (30) has a solution, that is finite.
Corollary 1. When a profit-oriented provider faces only
a competitor with null price, then under Assumption A there
exists a finite price p¯ > 0 that maximizes his revenue, whose
maximum value is strictly positive.
We illustrate those results when user valuations are dis-
tributed according to an exponential law with average value
1/λ = 10 monetary units. The risk function considered in
all our numerical computations is
Ri(x) = 1− e−x
for each provider i, which models the fact that systems with
no valuable data are not targeted while successful systems
are very likely to attract attacks.
Figures 2 and 3 display the evolution of V ∗1 (the data value
protected by provider 1) and the corresponding market share
θ1, respectively, when the price set by provider 1 varies.
Curves are plotted for pi1 = 0.01, for given values of the
vulnerability pi0 of the free alternative.
As shown in Figure 2, the equilibrium total value protected
by provider 1 decreases with the price p1, since some users
prefer to switch to the free provider. Nevertheless, this effect
is less prominent when the other alternative performs poorly
(here, when pi0 increases): users with very sensitive data are
willing to pay the extra price to keep benefitting from the
high-level protection.
With respect to provider 0, provider 1 only attracts the most
protection-sensitive users. As a result, his market share 1−
N (V ∗0 (p1)) decreases faster than his protected data value
share V ∗1 /Vtot, as can be seen in Figure 3. Both figures also
illustrate the continuity results of Proposition 3.
Figure 4 on the other hand displays provider 1’s revenue in
terms of his price p1. One can see that the optimal price
value of Proposition 5 can easily be obtained numerically
and that both (optimal) price and revenue increase with the
attack success probability at provider 0.
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Figure 4: Revenue of provider 1, when p1 varies.
5.2 Competition among providers: the risk of
price war
Competitive contexts where providers play on price to at-
tract customers often lead to price war situations, i.e., situa-
tions where each provider has an interest in decreasing one’s
price below the price of his competitor. The outcome then
corresponds to providers making no profit, and possibly not
surviving.
With the model presented in this paper, not all demand goes
to the cheapest provider because of the congestion effect due
to attackers’ behavior. However, some threshold effect still
exist, as illustrated by the non-continuity of provider market
shares when provider prices cross each other.
Let us for example consider two identical profit-oriented
providers and a free alternative. Due to the symmetry of the
game, one would expect a situation where both providers
set their price to the same level, say p > 0. As a result,
again from symmetry arguments both providers would be
chosen by users to protect, at equilibrium, the same value
V ∗1 = V
∗
2 := V
∗ of data each, while the free provider covers
a total data value V0. Then, if provider 1 sets his price to
p− ε for a small ε > 0, the market share repartition is such
that when ε→ 0,
θ0 = N (V ∗0 ),
θ1 = N (V ∗0 + V ∗)−N (V ∗0 ),
θ2 = N (V ∗0 + 2V ∗)−N (V ∗0 + V ∗).
When users choosing provider 1 or 2 are not all homogeneous
in their data valuations (which is for example the case if the
valuation distribution F admits a density), then θ1 > θ2. In
other words, provider 1 strictly improves his market share
(and thus his revenue) by setting his price just below the
price of his competitor. But provider 2 can make the exact
same reasoning, resulting in a price war situation.
Consequently, there can be no symmetric Nash equilibrium
(i.e., a price profile such that no provider can improve his
revenue by a unilateral change) where p1 = p2 > 0, despite
the symmetry of the pricing game. Furthermore, the price
profile where all prices are set to 0 is not an equilibrium
either: both providers would get no revenue, which each one
could strictly improve by a small price increase as stated in
Corollary 1.
Remark that this reasoning does not totally rule out the pos-
sibility of the pricing game having a (non-symmetric) Nash
equilibrium, however we cannot always guarantee that such
an equilibrium exists. An explanation to the existence of sta-
ble price profiles can nevertheless still be found from game-
theoretic arguments, since the pricing game among providers
is not played only once but repeatedly over time. When con-
sidering repeated games (i.e., where players take into account
not only their current payoff but also a discounted sum of
their future ones), the set of Nash equilibria is indeed much
larger than for their one-shot counterpart, as evidenced by
the Folk theorem [25]. The stability of prices can then stem
from the threat of being sanctioned by competitors for an
(immediate-profit) price change.
As a numerical illustration, we consider here three providers:
a provider 0 with performance parameter pi0 = 0.05, that
is always free: p0 = 0; and two profit-oriented providers,
namely 1 and 2, with respective performance values pi1 =
0.01 and pi2 = 0, 005. Providers protected data values and
market shares are shown in Figures 5 and 6, and the revenue
of provider 2 is displayed in Figure 7. The curves illus-
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Figure 5: Protected data values when provider 2
varies his price.
trate the continuity results of Proposition 3. Interestingly,
we remark for our numerical example that despite the dis-
continuity in revenue when prices cross each other, provider
2 actually has a revenue-maximizing price pBR2 (p1), that is
strictly below the price of his competitor.
This is also illustrated in Figure 8 where best-reply prices
pBRi (pj), i 6= j of both providers are plotted. That last figure
shows the price war situation: if providers engage in succes-
sive best-reply price adaptations to the competition, then
prices tend to very low values, which jeopardizes the viabil-
ity of security providers. On the contrary, a situation with
strictly positive prices from both providers could be stable
in a repeated game context. One just needs to check that for
a given price profile (p1, p2) each provider obtains at least
what he could obtain with an aggressive competitor (i.e.,
a competitor that tries to minimize the provider revenue).
Then, when providers value the future almost as much as
the present (i.e., when the discount factor that relates cur-
rent prices to future prices is close to 1), the price profile
(p1, p2) can be maintained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the repeated game [10].
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Figure 6: Market shares when provider 2 varies his
price.
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Figure 7: Revenue of provider 2 (pi2 = 0.005) when
facing provider 1 (pi1 = 0.01) and free provider 0 (pi0 =
0.05).
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Figure 8: Best-reply prices of provider 1 (pi1 = 0.01)
and provider 2 (pi2 = 0.005), with a free alternative
(pi0 = 0.05).
6. CONCLUSIONS
The model introduced in this paper takes into account the
attractiveness that successful security systems represent to
profit-minded attackers. This constitutes a negative exter-
nality among users: their (selfish) security choices then form
a noncooperative congestion game. We have considered het-
erogeneity among user valuations for data protection, which
affects both the externality level and the user cost functions.
The corresponding game is therefore a weighted congestion
game with user-specific payoffs. We have studied that game
for the case of a continuum of infinitesimal users, and have
proved that it admits a potential and therefore an equilib-
rium, that is unique when providers submit different prices.
The study of the user selection game has helped us under-
stand the interaction among security providers, who have
to attract customers but are then subject to quality degra-
dation due to more attacks, hence a trade-off. Our anal-
ysis shows that providers will keep their prices low, and
that competition may lead to price war situations, unless
providers consider long-term repeated interactions.
Future work will focus on the information asymmetry and
uncertainty among actors: we have studied the interactions
in a complete information context, whereas users may not
have a perfect knowledge of the performance level of the
different providers, or of their total protected data value.
Likewise, attackers can only estimate the potential gain from
targeting a given system.
Another interesting direction for future research concerns
the investment strategies that security providers should im-
plement: indeed, improving the protection performance has
a cost, that has to be compensated by the extra revenue due
to user subscription decisions. While there exist references
for this kind of problem when users are homogeneous [14],
the case when users have different weights deserves further
attention.
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